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0. The Licensing Question
Following Ladusaw (1980), NPIs are (widely) held to be licensed in downward
entailing (DE) contexts:
(1) a. I do*(n’t) see anyone.
b. Every/*some student(s) with any sense asked for help.
c. If you ever see a copy of this book, get it for me, please.
d. I doubt/*believe that anyone really knows how things will be next
summer.
Some contexts are more obviously downward entailing than others. Thus, it is 
clear that the negation in (1a) creates a DE context, but it is not quite as clear that 
the if in (1c) does. Moreover, some NPIs only like certain kinds of DE contexts 
and which ones occur in which contexts is an interesting question which has 
received considerable attention in the literature. We would like to abstract away 
from these issues here, however, and address another one: Why should NPIs be 
limited to semantically negative contexts, contexts that invert the direction of 
entailment (Fauconnier 1975)? Recent analyses attempt to answer this question by 
exploiting the semantics of NPIs (cf. Krifka 1995, Lahiri 1998, Chierchia 2006). 
We argue that while the distributional restrictions of NPIs are indeed related to 
their meanings, the distributional restriction of NPIs cannot be derived from for 
their meanings.  
1. A Semantic Answer to the Licensing Question?
Instead of describing the details of the various analyses which try to answer the
Licensing Question by exploiting the semantics of NPI, we focus on the basic idea
underlying these accounts (For some details see the appendix):
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(2)  Semantic answer to the Licensing Question:  
NPIs are low scalar elements that come with an operator requiring them to 
be the semantically strongest alternative.  
 
By low scalar elements we mean those elements that occupy the bottom rung on a 
Horn scale (Horn 1972). For instance, some is the bottom element of a scale of 
quantifiers including many, most and all. In non-negative contexts, some is the 
weakest of these scalar alternatives (i.e. a sentence with many entails an alterna-
tive with some). But in negative contexts, some is the strongest of the alternatives, 
as negation inverts the direction of entailment (Fauconnier 1975). Since low 
scalar elements are semantically strong in precisely those contexts that are DE, 
then, if one assumes (2), it follows that NPIs are limited to DE contexts. 
Several versions of (2) involve the presence of some form of even, either a 
concrete one (Lahiri 1998, see also Lee and Horn 1994) or an abstract one (e.g. 
Chierchia 2006). To sketch the workings of the semantic answer to the Licensing 
Question, it is thus useful to first look at even.  
The analyses mentioned above assume, with Kartunnen and Peters (1979), 
that ‘even’ picks out the least likely of the alternatives. (3), for instance, is said to 
give rise to the inferences in (4), which in Kartunnen and Peters’s account are 
phrased as conventional implicatures:  
 
(3) Even DEBBIE thought they had gone too far. 
 
(4) a. Conventional scalar implicature:  
  Debbie was the least likely among the relevant people to think that 
they had gone too far. 
 b. Existential implicature: 
  Someone other than Debbie thought that they had gone too far. 
 
There is a relationship between likelihood and entailment or semantic strength for 
scalar terms: If a sentence A that employs a scalar term is less likely than a 
sentence B, where B employs an alternative on the same scale, then the truth of A 
guarantees the truth B, i.e. A entails/is semantically stronger than B.  This means 
that if NPIs are composed of ‘even’ and low scalar elements, as (2) hypothesizes, 
then the relevant low scalar element has to offer the least likely or semantically 
strongest alternative. Since this is only the case in DE contexts, it follows that 
even + a low scalar element is restricted to these contexts. When applied to our 
initial example in (1a) this analysis works as follows: 
 
(5) I don’t see anyone. (= 1a) 
 
The sentence implicates that for the speaker to not see one person is less likely 
than for him or her not to see several people. This makes sense because not seeing 
one person entails not seeing several. By the same token, if the negation is absent, 
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the implicature generated by even and the entailment properties of the sentence 
clash; for the speaker to see one person is not less likely than for him or her to see 
several people, but rather more likely because whenever you see two or more 
persons, you also see one.   
Despite its elegance, the semantic answer to the licensing questions faces a 
number of difficulties (Herburger and Mauck 2007, Herburger to appear). Two, 
relatively minor ones concern even. Even though some languages use an overt 
even as part of their NPIs (e.g. Hindi), there are many NPIs which lack a visible 
instance of even, for example any and ever. For these, a tacit even (feature) has to 
be posited (cf. Chierchia 2006). Also, even may not pick out the least likely of the 
alternatives, but the most informative one (Kay 1990, Herburger 2000). If so, an 
operator other than even must actually be posited to pick out the semantically 
strongest alternative (cf. Chierchia’s 2006 and Krifka’s 1995 abstract operators). 
This somewhat weakens the appeal to cases where NPIs contain an overt form of 
even. 
 There are also four more serious problems. First, for the even analyses to 
work, it has to be stipulated that the licensing operator takes scope over the 
element responsible for the DE context, no matter how far away that element is. 
Second, unlicensed NPIs actually seem to result in ungrammaticality rather than 
pragmatic infelicity, contrary to what these analyses would predict (see also 
Gianniakidou 2001). Third, note that the presence of the licensing operator does 
not follow from the low scalar nature of NPIs—not all low scalar expressions are 
NPIs. This, however, means that the licensing operator has to be effectively 
stipulated. Fourth, a number of NPIs are not low scalar elements, e.g. much (in its 
NPI usage) and Spanish gran cosa. (Israel 1996). The even analyses do not extend 
to these in any obvious way. 
 
(6) a. I do*(n’t) have much time.  
 b. La    película  no  fue  gran  cosa. 
     The  film  not was big  thing   
     ‘The film wasn’t good.’ 
 
Given these issues, it may be worthwhile to contemplate an alternative to the 
semantic answer to the licensing question in (2). In what follows, we argue that it 
is not the semantics of NPIs that directly accounts for their distribution, but 
ultimately the presence of a lexical feature. The presence of this feature relates to 
the pragmatic usefulness of these expressions in certain contexts. 
 
2. On the Pragmatics of NPIs 
The pragmatics of NPIs and the role it might play in their licensing has not gone 
unnoticed. In particular, Israel (1996, 1997) develops an analysis of NPI licensing 
that does not only recognize that not all NPIs are low scalar elements but also 
pays close attention to how they function in discourse. We take his analysis as a 
point of departure. 
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2.1.  Israel’s (1996) Q- and I-Values  
Israel (1996) points to the heterogeneity of NPIs and accounts for the licensing of 
two classes of NPIs, namely low scalar NPIs like any and relatively high scalar 
NPIs like much, by positing two values, a q-value and an i-value. The q-value 
encodes the rung of the NPI on a Horn scale (Horn 1972); it is high if the NPI is 
high on the scale and low if it is low. The i-value, in turn, signals emphasis and 
semantic strength. A high i-value means that the ‘text proposition’ (TP; the 
sentence containing the NPI) entails an alternative ‘context proposition’ (CP), 
where the CP involves a mid-scalar expression (the ‘scalar norm’). A low i-value 
does the opposite. It encodes understatement and requires the TP to be entailed by 
the CP. Using these values, Israel proposes to lexically classify the two kinds of 
NPIs he discerns in the following way: 
 
(7) a. low q-value + high i-value = low scalar NPIs (any, ever,  
budge an inch) 
 b. high q-value + low i-value = high scalar NPIs (much, gran cosa, long) 
 
The central point is that the classification in (7) predicts that NPIs will only 
appear in DE contexts. To see why this is so, let us first consider the low scalar 
NPIs described in (7a). A TP in which a low scalar element appears will only 
entail a CP involving a mid scalar element if both are negative: 
 
(8)  I can’t see anyone. 
  TP: I can’t see one(some) person. 
  CP: I can’t see two or more persons. 
  High i-value: TP entails CP 
 
Turning now to the high scalar NPIs described in (7b), note that a TP with a high 
scalar element will only be entailed by a CP involving a mid scalar element, as 
demanded by the high i-value, if both TP and CP are negative: 
 
(9)  I don’t have much time. 
  TP: I don’t have a large amount of time. 
  CP: I don’t have a medium amount of time. 
  Low i-value: CP entails TP  
 
As appealing as this account is, it, too, raises some issues. First, what is the scalar 
norm? Sometimes what is at the bottom of the scale may in fact be what is ‘nor-
mal,’ but Israel is forced to appeal to a CP that indicates the middle of a scale, no 
matter what ‘normal’ in a given context may be. Second, all low scalar elements, 
regardless of whether they are NPIs are not, lead to semantically strong and hence 
potentially emphatic claims in DE contexts. Likewise, all high scalar expressions 
lend themselves to semantically weak and hence potentially understating claims in 
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DE contexts. This just follows from the nature of scales and the semantics of 
negation. 
  
(10) a. I can’t see one (ONE) person.  
  b. I can’t see two people. 
  c. One person has to volunteer to drive him back to the airport. 
 
(10a) entails (10b), showing that one is semantically stronger than two, but (10c) 
shows that it is not an NPI. If, then, emphasis or the lack thereof follows directly 
from the scalar rung, the i-value does not really mark (lack of) emphasis, despite 
its name, but ultimately marks (in combination with the ‘right’ q-value) that the 
element in question is an NPI. Might we then not call things by their name and 
say that NPIs are lexically marked as NPIs? 
  
2.2. The Pragmatic Road to Formal NPI-hood 
The discussion of both the semantic licensing accounts and Israel’s more prag-
matically flavored account lead us to the following conclusion regarding the 
Licensing Question (Herburger and Mauck 2007, Herburger to appear): 
 
(11) A syntactic answer to the Licensing Question: 
An NPI differs from a non-NPI in carrying a formal feature. 
For concreteness, let us call it [u-neg]. 
 
While we believe that NPI licensing is a syntactic phenomenon, there is clearly a 
relationship between scales and NPIs. The rung an NPI occupies on a scale does 
not derive its distribution, but it ‘merely’ has pragmatic consequences that help 
explain how the distribution could come about. 
Beginning with low scalar NPIs, we saw earlier that low scalar elements in 
negative contexts are semantically strong. This makes them pragmatically useful 
when one wants to make a strong or emphatic claim (Jespersen 1917). We believe 
that this pragmatic usefulness can lead some low scalar elements to being lexi-
cally restricted to negative contexts. Which ones are, however, is to some extent 
arbitrary. Consider in this context for instance the difference between any and 
some; both arguably denote existential quantifiers and occupy the bottom rung of 
a quantity scale (assuming that any is a low scalar element, cf. Carlson 1980, and 
also the appendix), but only any is an NPI. 
As for relatively high scalar elements, they are pragmatically valuable in DE 
contexts in a different way: they allow for a rather weak, evasive claim and, as a 
consequence, they also allow for understatement. (12) thus can be taken to mean 
that the speaker has some but not much time (weak claim) or that she has no time 
at all (understatement): 
 
(12) I don’t have much time. 
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The weak claim follows from a regular scalar implicature (Levinson 2000): 
Quantity implicates the negation of stronger alternatives. Since negation reverses 
the direction of entailment, the stronger alternative to much in (12) is some, i.e. 
(12) implicates that it is not the case that the speaker does not have some time, 
which amounts to saying that she has some time. The understated claim, we 
argue, arises when Quantity is suspended, and the speaker did not say everything 
there was to say. Since Quantity is inoperative, no scalar implicature is generated 
and (12) does not implicate the negation of ‘I don’t have some time’. In sum, we 
both expressions that lead to strong claims in negative contexts (low scalar 
expressions) and those that lend themselves to understated claims are pragmati-
cally useful. Some, because of this, become restricted to such contexts. Those that 
do, bear a feature marking them as NPIs ([u-neg]). 
 
2.3.  The Relative Arbitrariness of NPI-hood 
On our view, any expression with the ‘right’ scalar value can in principle be an 
NPI but does not have to. Because being an NPI amounts to nothing more than 
bearing a feature, we expect that over time expressions might change their status. 
Thus, it would not be surprising if the same element could be an NPI at one point 
in time and not in another. There may indeed be evidence for this, as we would 
like to show now.  
According to Jäger (2006, 2007), the existential German einig- ‘some’, which 
can nowadays freely occur in non-DE contexts, used to be an NPI in Old High 
German.  
 
(13) buuzssan einigan zuuiuun ist dhanne archennit,   dhazs 
  Without   any      doubt  is   then     recognized  that 
  ‘It is recognized without any doubt that…’ (OHG; Isidor VI.5) 
 
The fact that in Modern High German, einig- still has an existential meaning 
but no longer the distribution of an NPIs suggests, in our terms, that einig- used to 
have a [u-neg] feature, but no longer does.  
Similarly, Greek kanenas ‘anyone’ derives from kai ‘even’ and henas ‘one’. 
Strikingly, while it is employed in many dialects of Modern Greek as a typical 
even NPI, it is also used as a simple, positive indefinite in some dialects, notably 
Cretan (Kiparsky and Condoravdi 2006). For us this means that in Cretan kiane-
nas does not bear a [u-neg] feature. (Note that it also supports the claim that it is 
not the even in even NPIs that is responsible for their distribution.)  
 
(14) kianenas perastikos da     perase       ki   Ɲkopse ta   portokalia 
some    passerby   here  passed-by and cut     the  oranges 
 
In the two examples we have discussed so far, a lexical item that has the NPI 
feature [u-neg] loses it at some point in its history. One might also wonder if it is 
possible for [u-neg] to become [i-neg], that is if it is possible for an uninter-
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pretable feature, which simply demands the presence of a negative element 
elsewhere, to change into an interpretable feature, which makes a clear semantic 
contribution of its own namely negation. We think that this may indeed be possi-
ble. More specifically, we think it offers a way of conceptualizing part of the 
Jespersen Cycle, where an NPI over the course of time comes to be negative 
element in its own right. For instance, nobody, which used to function as an NPI 
in Middle English and still does so in many dialects, became a negative element 
in many dialects of early Modern English and is used this way today in standard 
English dialects. In other words, depending on the dialect/era, (1a) (I didn’t see 
anyone) can be expressed by either (15a) or (15b): 
 
(15) a. I didn’t see nobody. dialectal, historical 
 b. I saw nobody.   standard 
 
If what we argue in this paper is correct, the fact that nobody was historically an 
NPI and is now (standardly) a negative quantifier amounts to saying that nobody 
historically bore a [u-neg] feature but now bears an [i-neg] feature. 
 Interestingly, the Jespersen Cycle also seems to be taking place in at least one 
language that has even NPIs, namely Modern Hebrew, which has morphologically 
complex NPIs containing an instance of even (af).1 Though these NPIs generally 
require negation to be licensed, this is not the case in elliptical answers, as shown 
in (16). This might suggest that these elements are on their way to becoming 
negative expressions in their own right, similar to English nobody. 
 
(16) A: mi   ba? 
   who came  
   ‘Who came?’ 
  B: af      exad (*lo) 
   even  one    not 
   ‘No one.’ 
 
What further lends credence to this suspicion is the fact that in the speech of some 
children and teenagers, af exad is starting to be used without negation in preverbal 
positions, even though it still requires a negation when it appears in a postverbal 
position: 
 
(17) af      exad oxel  et    ha-uga 
  even  one  eats   acc the-cake 
  ‘No one is eating the cake’ 
                                                 
1 While afilu (literally af ‘even’ + ilu ‘counterfactual conditional’) has replaced af as ‘even’ in 
standard oral Hebrew, af is still used in high register and newspaper Hebrew, and can be under-
stood as meaning ‘even’ by those who learn these varieties of Hebrew (which are taught in  
school). 
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This change would seem to be unexpected if the distribution of NPIs depended on 
even, but can be understood if, as we have proposed, NPIs are somewhat arbitrar-
ily marked by a syntactic feature that can change over time. In particular, we can 
surmise that currently even expressions of the relevant sort in Hebrew are am-
biguous at this point and marked either [u-neg], in which case they function like 
NPIs, or [i-neg], in which case they are negative. A similar account can be 
extended to n-words in languages like Spanish if they are ambiguous between 
NPIs and genuinely negative expressions (Herburger 2001). 
 
3 .  Conclusion and an Open Question 
We have argued in this paper that what makes a particular item with the requisite 
scalar (and hence pragmatic) disposition an NPI is ‘merely’ a formal feature, [u-
neg] and that NPI licensing ultimately amounts to a process of feature checking. 
We also speculated that expressions of the right scalar sort cannot only acquire 
this feature in the course of history, they can also lose it. Moreover, the feature 
can acquire semantic content and turn into [i-neg]. This offers a way of conceptu-
alizing part of the Jespersen Cycle. If NPI licensing amounts to feature checking, 
this of course raises the question of how this feature checking works. One possi-
ble answer might involve substantive decomposition of NPI licensors into [neg] + 
something else, cf. Ludlow’s L* (Herburger and Mauck 2007). We are currently 
exploring whether and how this would offer an account of the syntactic licensing 
of NPIs. 
 
4.  Appendix: Some Semantic Licensing Accounts 
In this section we very briefly summarize some of the even accounts mentioned 
earlier in the paper and some of their precursors. Our discussion is meant to 
illustrative rather than exhaustive.  
 
4.1.  Kadmon and Landman (1993) 
While Kadmon and Landman’s (1993) account does not posit that NPIs contain 
an even or trigger the presence of an even-like operator, it does use the internal 
semantics of NPIs to explain their distribution and would seem to have inspired 
many of the proposals that followed it. According to Kadmon and Landman, any, 
on both its NPI and free choice interpretation (the latter of which we will not 
discuss) is an indefinite, like some, but with added features of ‘widening’ and 
‘strengthening’. The widening applies to the domain of quantification of the noun 
the NPI modifies. For instance, according to Kadmon and Landman, some pota-
toes might normally rule out very small potatoes or moldy potatoes, but any 
potatoes includes in its domain of quantification all potatoes, including the 
marginal ones. The strengthening induced by any then requires that the widening 
it induces be a stronger statement, i.e. that the statement on the widened interpre-
tation will entail the statement on the normal, narrow interpretation (much as even 
requires the sentence it appears in to entail a weaker alternative). This will happen 
only in downward entailing environments. To see this, consider: 
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(18) I don’t have any potatoes. 
 
If any induces widening, (18) states that the speaker does not have potatoes, 
normal ones or very small ones. This entails a statement without the widening, 
that the speaker does not have normal potatoes. Now consider a sentence without 
negation: 
 
(19) *I have any potatoes. 
 
If the same widening is involved, the requirement for strengthening is not satis-
fied, because the wide meaning of ‘I have potatoes of some kind (normal or very 
small)’ does not entail the narrow meaning of ‘I have normal potatoes’. Thus, the 
NPI is excluded. Of course, much on this account depends on any having a larger 
quantificational domain than some. Several authors have voiced skepticism 
(Krifka 1995, Lahiri 1998), pointing out that only stressed any seems to induce 
something that can be called widening, whereas ‘normal’ unstressed any seems to 
have a quantificational domain similar to that of some. 
 
4.2. Lee and Horn (1994) 
Lee and Horn (1994) claim that the distribution of any results from the fact that it 
is an indefinite with an incorporated even, where even has the meaning described 
in section 1. Rather than making use of the implicatures that even generates, 
however, Lee and Horn make use of the fact that these implicatures require the 
existence of a scale of likelihood associated with the sentence. They then posit 
that any is licensed only where such a scale can be constructed. Whether or not a 
scale can be constructed can be determined by whether or not even a single or 
even + a superlative can appear in a sentence. Thus, pointing to examples like (20) 
and (21), Lee and Horn predict that any can occur in a sentence if even a single or 
even + a superlative can occur in the same position in that sentence: 
 
(20) a. *There is any boy running around in the garden. 
 b. *There is even a single boy running around in the garden. 
 
(21) a. There isn’t any boy running around in the garden. 
 b. There isn’t even a single boy running around in the garden. 
 
Lee and Horn also noted that many languages, such as Hindi, Modern Hebrew, 
Korean, and Turkish include an instance of even as part of their NPIs, a fact that 
would be important in some of the accounts of NPI licensing that followed theirs.  
 
4.3.  Krifka (1995) 
Krifka (1995) assumes that NPIs are low scalar expressions that trigger alterna-
tives. He furthermore assumes that the sentences they appear in are interpreted in 
terms of structured meanings where the NPI is ‘foreground’ and the rest of the 
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clause is abstracted over and represents the ‘background’. He then posits that the 
alternatives for ‘weak’ NPIs (e.g. any, ever) include more specific instances, e.g. 
books, pencils for anything. The alternatives for ‘strong’ NPIs (e.g. ANYthing, at 
all, a drop) are the same with the additional proviso that no marginal cases are 
included (cf. Kadmon and Landman 1993). He then posits that weak NPIs trigger 
the presence of Scal.Assert and strong NPIs that of Empahtic.Assert. 
Scal.Assert is an operator that gives rise to an implicature, in particular the 
implicature that no alternatives to the weak NPI result in true assertions. On this 
account, a sentence like (22) is ruled out because of an implicature that conflicts 
with the meaning; if Mary saw something then it is true, rather than false, contrary 
to what the implicature triggered by Scal.Assert would demand, that she saw 
something specific, e.g. a pencil. (23), in contrast, is acceptable because the 
implicature generated by Scal.Assert is consistent with the meaning of the sen-
tence: 
 
(22) *Mary saw anything. 
(23) Mary didn’t see anything. 
 
Like even, Emphatic.Assert requires that the proposition asserted be less likely 
than any alternative proposition and, furthermore requires that it also be less 
likely than the conjunction of all alternative proposition involving minor entities. 
The result is that the asserted proposition has to be extremely unlikely and that 
minor entities are excluded (a la Kadmon and Landman 1993). 
 
4.4. Lahiri (1998) 
Lahiri (1998) observes that in Hindi NPIs consist of a low scalar element + bhii 
‘even.’ 
 
(24) koii  bhii  nahiiN  aayaa 
  some  even  not  came 
  ‘No one came.’  
 
He argues that bhii is a focus particle with a meaning similar to that of even and 
which picks out the least likely and hence semantically strongest of the focus 
alternatives. As we saw in section 1, this predicts that the relevant expressions are 
only felicitous in those contexts where low scalar elements are the strongest, 
namely DE contexts (Lahiri also extends his analysis to free choice context, but 
we will not go into that here.). 
 
4.5. Chierchia (2006) 
Finally, Chierchia (2006) maintains that the NPI any is an existential quantifier 
with a widened domain (cf. Kadmon and Landman 1993), which comes with 
alternative domains involving subsets of the original quantificational domain. He 
furthermore assumes that the occurrence of the NPI any triggers the presence of 
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an even-like operator Ec. Ec requires that the proposition expressed by the sen-
tence entail all alternative propositions derived with the help of the alternative 
domains (cf. Krifka’s 1995 Emphatic.Assert, cf. even). The operator thus has the 
meaning in (25): 
 
(25) Ec(p) = p  q  C [pq] 
 
Since the alternative domains are smaller than the original, widened one, a 
proposition involving an element in the original domain will only entail a proposi-
tion involving an element from a smaller alternative domain if it is embedded in a 
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